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1. Introduction
There is much going on in Santibanez’s very interesting and densely packed paper. In the short
time that I have, I cannot comment on all of it. I simply want to focus on one important claim
that he makes, viz., that deception in the form of lying involving manipulation of others to
achieve self-interested ends can do damage to the recipient of the lie. On the assumption that at
least in some cases, this damage can be ongoing and very serious (as in the case of lying in
political contexts), it would seem to follow that manipulative lying is morally objectionable in
those cases. However, Santibanez does not take the further step of saying this explicitly. At the
same time, the language used by the author throughout the paper suggests that he may assent to
the claim that such lies are morally wrong: for example, even when discussing more benign
forms of deception such as deceiving oneself into believing that they are a very good professor or
a soccer player’s deceiving their opponents about their intent, there is reference to ‘damage’ and
to the ‘victim’ of the deception. The concepts of damage and victimization tend to be seen in a
negative moral light.
While using the language of ‘victimization’ and ‘damage’ Santibanez also grants that
there are cases where self-deception and deceiving others are advantageous, and that animals
deceiving predators, for example, leads to reproductive fitness, so that deception can be
evolutionarily adaptive. Moreover, he seems to find the modular model of the mind
countenanced by Kurzban (2012) to have some prima facie plausibility. However, he also
appears to reject what the model entails, viz., that there is no real ‘you,’ so that all that I am or
you are is a set of modules with distinct beliefs, where beliefs from one module can contradict
beliefs from another module. A further implication of the model that Santibanez appears to reject
but that Kurzban (2012) accepts is that agents use whatever module is most advantageous in the
context and that this is simply the way we are set up by nature via the mechanism of evolution. It
is worth mentioning that the idea of the modular mind is not a new one: it has been around for
awhile. For example, Fodor (1983) advances the modularity thesis as does Stalnaker (1984) in an
attempt to resolve the problem of deduction for doxastic logics. Stalnaker talks about distinct
‘acceptance states’ where a proposition in one acceptance state may contradict a proposition in
another acceptance state. And of course, there is the tripartite model of the psyche advanced by
Freud (1977) where one may believe one thing consciously (X is good) and believe the opposite
subconsciously (X is bad), known as ‘splitting’ (Rubens 1996). Moreover, the tripartite theory of
the psyche adopted by Freud has its origins in Plato’s Republic.
In the remainder of this commentary, I shall argue that the modular model of the mind
rings true, and that if it is true, then there is no overriding agent except perhaps in a narrative
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sense. If there is no overriding agent, then there is no-one of whom it can be said that deception
is wrong in any sense, including a moral one. Moreover, exactly who is doing the deceiving if
there is no unified agent? And who is being deceived? This is not to suggest that deception is
always acceptable and that social control of deception is inappropriate, since utilitarian
considerations do not rely on responsibility or personal identity. Further, I shall argue that even
manipulative lying that causes ongoing damage to its victims is not always a bad thing
depending on who the victim is. Perhaps Santibanez would not disagree with this claim, although
I believe that it is worth discussing.
2. Modularity, deception and responsibility
There is no decisive argument for or against the modularity of the mind hypothesis, although
there is some empirical evidence out there to suggest that it is true. Mind you, there has been
great resistance to the modularity hypothesis over the millennia since Plato proposed it in the
Republic 2,300 years ago. For example, while Hume proposed a skeptical limiting case of
modularity, Kant replied with the concept of the transcendental unity of apperception. Although
skeptical about a unified ego in his early writings, Husserl later took the position that experience
presupposes an ego, which bears affinities to Kant’s notion of the unity of apperception (Miller
1986). One piece of evidence to suggest the truth of modularity is a recent study conducted by
Athanasopoulos et al. (2015) where they found that people who are fluent in both German and
English conceptualize the motion of objects differently in German than they do in English. Thus,
the authors claim that such persons are of “two minds” (Athanasopoulos et al. 2015, p. 518).
Along similar lines, Peretz and Cotheart (2003) provide evidence from neuroimaging that
modularity is involved in music processing rather than there being one central processing faculty.
More generally, Harter et al. (1997) cite evidence from developmental studies that
purportedly show that “during adolescence there is a proliferation of selves that vary as a
function of social context” (Harter et al. 1997, 837). Thus, an adolescent will behave in opposing
and contradictory ways across various social circles so that a young person may behave a certain
way with their parents, another way with teachers and yet another way with their peers (Harter et
al. 1997). The authors go on to argue that as an individual matures, they come to accept this
diversity of selves as something good (Harter et al. 1997). Anecdotally and parenthetically, I
notice of myself that I behave differently with bar buddies, cigar buddies, members of my
bowling team, with students, with colleagues, with close friends, with relatives, etc. so that there
is no obvious ‘I’ across all of these social situations that is completely invariant, except upon
abstract reflective narration. The importance of variation in identity as a function of social
context is also observed by Ellemers et al. (2002). As the person matures, they tend to form a
coherent and quasi-consistent picture of these disparate selves through self-narrative (Harter et
al. 1997), although this unification strategy is thwarted in the case of those with personality
disorders such as bipolar personality (Jorgensen 2006). This story-telling later in life gives rise to
the concept of the so-called narrative self as discussed by MacIntyre (1981), by McAdams
(2001) as well as in hermeneutic circles. This narrative self is more of an abstraction, a nonfictional coherent story as opposed to a real ‘self’ with any causal powers.
And so, there is some reason to believe that modularity is true. Then it follows that
outside of the narrative self, there may well be no ‘I’ that deceives nor that is deceived. In such a
case, how is deception even possible? How can I deceive myself if there is no ‘self’ that exists
outside of a narrative context, and how can I deceive you if there is no ‘you’ to deceive?
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Moreover, even if the concepts of deception and self-deception somehow apply, there is no ‘I’
that bears responsibility, moral or otherwise, for any damage done to the ‘victim’ of a lie, nor is
it clear that there is any victim at all to whom the responsibility for the lie transfers. The modular
model of the mind employed by Kurzban (2012) and the picture that deception is simply the
application of the most advantageous model in that context becomes more compelling in light of
the empirical evidence for modularity.
3. Manipulative lying as an optimal strategy in dire situations
As noted above, Santibanez cites manipulative lying as being a potentially undesirable type of
lying given that the recipients can suffer ongoing harm. I do not disagree with this claim, putting
aside the issue of modularity, although what I disagree with is Santibanez’s further claim that the
aim of argumentation theory with respect to manipulative lying “would be to have the liar justify
himself and, for this reason, make a fool of himself.” (Santibanez 2016, p. 23) There will be
many cases, countless cases, when the manipulative liar can justify their actions without making
a fool of themselves. The types of cases I have in mind are situations where manipulative lying
saves the lives of hundreds, thousands, millions. These types of lies are the true ‘noble’ lies as
opposed to the arguably bogus noble lie outlined in the Republic! For example, citizens of
Amsterdam hid thousands of Jewish children during World War II, which of course involved
deceit, lies and manipulation of the occupying Germans. The brave people who hid these
children at great personal risk would not make fools of themselves if they were asked to justify
their covert actions. This is clearly a case where honesty is not the best policy! Similar
observations apply to the lies and deceit used by the resistance movements in Europe in the
1940s to overcome the Nazi occupation. What about undercover officers breaking up the 1
percenter motorcycle gangs involved in drug dealing and murder? These officers use deceit, lies
and manipulation to infiltrate these gangs and yet, it would be hard to imagine them making
fools of themselves in justifying their subterfuge, even though the people arrested are damaged.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that there is reason to believe that the modularity thesis, or some
version of it, is true. This is based on empirical studies. Then the whole notion of self-deceit,
deceit of others and lying has to be either dropped or re-worked to cohere with the modularity
thesis. This is not to condone deceit and lying (if it makes sense to talk of these) as these actions
can be seen as morally wrong from a purely utilitarian perspective. The unit of assessment in
utilitarian ethics is the social aggregate and not unified individuals so that lying could be
justifiably curtailed for the good of the aggregate. Finally, putting aside the modularity thesis, I
agree with the author’s suggestion that lying involving manipulation for self-interested ends is
often undesirable, although there are also many cases when lying is a good thing, as in the
situation of saving lives.
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